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A FAIR USE ANALYSIS OF TRADEMARK PARODY:
CLIFFS NOTES, INC. v. BANTAM DOUBLEDAY
DELL PUBLISHING GROUP
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of trademarks to identify the source of products dates back
to the civilizations of ancient Egypt and Greece, and to medieval Europe,
where guilds often required their members to identify their products to
detect false or defective wares.' As societies industrialized and the need
for trademark protection grew, British law recognized a cause of action
for copying a trademark in the early seventeenth century.2 In the nine-
teenth century, 3 American law recognized the common law causes of ac-
tion for unfair competition and trademark infringement. Congress later
offered federal protection and registration of trademarks under the
Trademark Act of 1946.1
Parody5 also dates back to ancient civilizations. Numerous writers
satirized Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, and Aristophane's plays humor-
ously imitated the dramatic styles of Euripides and Sophocles.6 Today,
parodies play an important social role that is protected by the first
amendment.7 Parodies serve a socially informative function by exposing
the original works' flaws and pretensions, the mediocre and pretentious
statements in art and society, and ultimately forces us to examine serious
works from a comic standpoint.'
Thus, trademarks and parodies have existed in one form or another
for centuries. Yet, the satirization of trademarks raises issues that the
law has difficulty solving today. This difficulty arises from the competing
policies of avoiding consumer confusion under trademark law, and pro-
1. Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (quoting F. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trademarks 47
(1925)).
2. Id. at 1332 (quoting Southern v. How, Popham 143, 79 Eng. Reprint 1243 (1618)).
3. Id. (citing Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844)).
4. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1128 (West 1990), as amended by Act of Nov.
16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, Title I, § 103, 102 Stat. 3935.
5. A parody is an imitation for humorous or satirical effect of a piece of literature, music,
or composition. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10. 12[A], at 311 (1989).
6. Note, Piracy or Parody: Never The Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 550, 551 (1966).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech."
8. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.12[A], at 311 (1989).
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viding free expression for parodies.9
Trademark protection traditionally allowed manufacturers to iden-
tify their products.10 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
eroded this function of trademark law in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. ("Cliffs Notes, Inc."). 1 In Cliffs
Notes, Inc. the appellate court granted Bantam Doubleday Dell Publish-
ing Group ("Doubleday") the right to reproduce the registered trade-
mark cover design of Cliffs Notes, Inc. ("Cliffs") because Doubleday's
cover merely parodied the cover of Cliffs Notes. 2 The appellate court,
attempting to determine the legal effect of parodies on trademark law,
applied a test which stated that trademark law restrictions apply to artis-
tic works "only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression."13 The appellate court's
test in Cliffs Notes, Inc. was designed to incorporate first amendment
concerns in trademark law. But the court erred in applying that test
because it only selected factors that clearly favor parodists. First, the
court analyzed the consumer confusion prong of the test 4 by selecting
only the most favorable factors to parodists and overlooked factors most
favorable to trademark owners. A better approach would be for the
court to apply a neutral test with factors balancing towards both the
trademark owners and the parodists.
Second, under the free-expression prong of the test, 5 the court lik-
ened Doubleday's infringement to copyright law's fair use doctrine.
Nevertheless, the court failed to establish the limits of what can be copied
by a parody under the doctrine.
9. Compare Girl Scouts of the United States of America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) with Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Girl Scouts, the defendant had produced and distributed posters
describing a pregnant girl wearing the standard Girl Scout uniform, with the Girl Scout motto
"Be Prepared" printed beneath the pregnant girl. 304 F. Supp. at 1230. The court held that
there was no likelihood of consumer confusion and therefore no infringement of plaintiff's
trademark. Id. at 1231. In contrast, the Coca-Cola case which has similar facts to those in
Girl Scouts, held there was trademark dilution. 346 F. Supp. 1183. In Coca-Cola, the defend-
ant had designed and marketed a poster featuring a logo identical in color and configuration to
Coca-Cola's "Enjoy Coca-Cola" trademark, using "Enjoy Cocaine" instead. Id. at 1186-87.
The court held that the difference between Coca-Cola's trademark and the defendant's rendi-
tion constituted only a minor variance, provoking a likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. at
1191.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 64-74.
11. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
12. Id. at 497.
13. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
14. 886 F.2d at 495-96.
15. Id. at 496.
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The fair use doctrine only applies to copyright law and is not pres-
ent in trademark law.' 6 However, in adjudicating trademark parody
cases some courts have implicitly applied the copyright law's fair use
doctrine. 7 The copyright analogy is helpful to understand the special
protection that parodies are granted under the first amendment, because
parodies of literary works serve a socially informative function by expos-
ing the original's flaws and pretensions.'" Thus, by analogy to copyright
law, trademark parodies serve a socially informative function by expos-
ing the original product's flaws, which is a form of free expression pro-
tected by the first amendment. 9 However, a court which applies a fair
use analysis should go through a complete analysis, otherwise the court
will arrive at a result inconsistent with the fair use doctrine. Thus, the
appellate court in Cliffs Notes, Inc. erred in applying a limited fair use
analysis. This note analyzes the facts of Cliffs Notes, Inc. under a com-
plete fair use doctrine analysis, and arrives at the conclusion that
Doubleday would not benefit from the fair use doctrine. Thus, the appel-
late court's limited fair use analysis accorded trademark parodies too
much freedom, and abrogated trademark owner's rights to product rec-
ognition and avoidance of consumer confusion.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cliffs publishes a line of study guides entitled Cliffs Notes, which
bear a specific black and yellow cover design.20 The design of the cover
consists of a layout of yellow and black diagonal stripes, and contains the
design of a mountain.2' Cliffs has used this cover design since 1958, and
has registered the design with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.22
Spy Magazine, a monthly magazine published by Doubleday, cre-
16. The fair use doctrine is codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 under 17 U.S.C.A. § 107
(West 1990) and has no counterpart in trademark law.
17. See, e.g., Stop The Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp.
1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Girl Scouts of The United States of America v. Personality Posters
Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421
F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
18. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use And First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1079, 1105 n. 138 (1986) (citing Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech- The Replacement of
the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 42 (1980).
19. 886 F.2d at 493. The court stated that "parody is a form of artistic expression, pro-
tected by the First Amendment."
20. Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 718 F. Supp. 1159,
1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
21. Id
22. Id
1991]
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ated Spy Notes, which satirizes Cliffs' study guides by using a similar
cover design.23 Spy Notes resembles Cliffs Notes in many respects: it
contains the characteristic yellow and black diagonal stripes; it follows
the same format and type style of the Cliffs Notes titles; and, it catego-
rizes its feature of books in the same fashion as Cliffs Notes.24 Spy Notes
differs from Cliffs Notes in that it creates satires of popular urban novels
of the 1980's instead of Cliffs Notes' traditional summary of classic works
of literature, it is labeled "A Satire" five times in red lettering on the
front cover, and depicts a sculpture of New York City in place of the
mountain which appears on Cliffs Notes.2"
Cliffs brought a suit in the United States District Court of New
York against Doubleday alleging a federal cause of action under section
43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, and alleging state law causes of
action under the common law rule of unfair competition and trademark
dilution.26 Cliffs sought a preliminary injunction contending that
Doubleday's imitation of the Cliffs Notes cover design constituted trade-
mark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition.27 The
district court granted Cliffs' request for preliminary injunction, enjoining
Doubleday from distributing Spy Notes with its current cover design.28
The court granted the preliminary injunction because the similarity of
Spy Notes' cover to Cliffs Notes was likely to confuse consumers, thereby
causing irreparable harm to Cliffs.
2 9
Doubleday filed an appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, seeking a dismissal of the preliminary injunction. 3° The appellate
court vacated the injunction, stating that the public interest in freedom of
expression outweighed the slight risk of consumer confusion generated
by the Spy Notes cover.3
A. Reasoning of the District Court
The district court granted Cliffs a preliminary injunction barring
Doubleday from distributing Spy Notes with a cover design similar to
Cliffs Notes based on its finding that Cliffs had demonstrated irreparable
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 886 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1989).
26. 718 F. Supp. at 1160.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1168.
29. Id.
30. 886 F.2d at 491.
31. Id. at 497.
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injury and a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.3 2
Under New York's standard for granting a preliminary injunction,
the party requesting an injunction must show irreparable harm, and
either a likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficiently serious ques-
tion going to the merits to make it a fair ground for litigation.33 Further-
more, the balance of hardships must tip toward the party requesting
relief.34 In an action for trademark infringement, the crucial issue is the
likelihood that consumers may be confused as to the source of sponsor-
ship of the trademark.35 To establish the necessary level of confusion, a
plaintiff must show that an appreciable number of ordinary prudent pur-
chasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the goods.36
The district court used the test of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec-
tronics Corp.37 This test set forth several factors to determine the likeli-
hood of confusion: (1) the strength of plaintiff's mark,38 (2) the degree of
similarity between the two marks,39 (3) the competitive proximity of the
products," (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,4
(5) actual confusion,42 (6) defendant's good faith in adopting its own
mark,43 (7) the quality of defendant's product," and (8) the sophistica-
32. 718 F. Supp. at 1168. The court concluded that Cliffs would suffer irreparable injury if
Doubleday published its Spy Notes, because Cliffs' proved that a publication of Spy Notes
would cause consumer confusion. Id.
33. Id. at 1168.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Id. at 1161 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112,
115 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986)).
36. Id. at 1162 (quoting Andy Warhol Enterprises, Inc. v. Time Inc., 700 F. Supp. 760,
763 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
37. 718 F. Supp. at 1164 (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
38. Cliff's Notes, 718 F. Supp. at 1165 (quoting McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc.,
599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)). The Second Circuit explained this factor as a trademark's
"tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular ...
source." Id.
39. Id. at 1165 (quoting C.L.A.S.S. Promotions v. D.S. Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 18
(2d Cir. 1985)). In determining the similarity of the marks, the pertinent inquiry is "the gen-
eral impression conveyed to the purchasing public by the respective marks." Id.
40. Id. at 1165 (quoting Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.
1988)). "Products which directly compete in the market place warrant a finding of the highest
degree of competitive proximity." Id.
41. Id. at 1166 (quoting Hasbro, 858 F.2d at 78). This factor is determined according to
the "likelihood that the senior user of the mark will bridge the gap by entering the market in
which the junior user operates." Id.
42. Id. (quoting Hasbro, 858 F.2d at 78). A plaintiff is not required to show actual confu-
sion in order to prevail on its claim. Id
43. 718 F. Supp. at 1166 (quoting Hasbro, 858 F.2d at 78). This factor determines
whether the junior user used bad faith in adopting plaintiff's mark. Id.
44. Id. at 1167 (quoting Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 830 F.2d
1991]
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tion45 of the buyers.' The district court found that Cliffs' mark was
particularly strong, and that Doubleday's cover design was sufficiently
similar to plaintiff's design to a degree that would cause consumer confu-
sion.4 ' The district court concluded that a consumer might not know
whether Cliffs was satirizing Spy Magazine, or whether Spy Notes was a
division of Cliffs, and therefore the Spy Notes cover would lead to con-
sumer confusion as to the source of the product.4"
. Reasoning of the Appellate Court
The appellate court vacated the preliminary injunction issued by the
district court, and granted Doubleday the right to publish its Spy Notes
because the cover of Spy Notes raised only a slight risk of consumer con-
fusion, which was outweighed by the public interest in free expression.49
The court began with the proposition that parody is a form of artis-
tic expression protected by the first amendment."o As a result parody
and satire deserve substantial freedom as a form of entertainment, and
social and literary criticism.5' The appellate court also recognized the
competing policy of avoiding consumer confusion stemming from an in-
fringement of a trademark.52 In order to strike a balance between the
competing policies, the appellate court chose the test enunciated in Rog-
ers v. Grimaldi 1 This test states that the Lanham Act54 restrictions ap-
ply to artistic works "only where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression."55
The appellate court acknowledged that Rogers was concerned with a dif-
ferent problem; namely, whether a movie title can constitute false adver-
tising.56 The present case contained the added element of parody.
Nonetheless, the court decided that the Rogers balancing test applied be-
cause artistic freedom of parody deserved the same protection as movie
1217, 1228 (2d Cir. 1987)). A lack of marked difference between goods supports the inference
that they emanate from the same source. Id.
45. Id. at 1168 (quoting Hasbro, 858 F.2d at 79). Generally, unsophisticated consumers
aggravate the likelihood of confusion. Id
46. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
47. Cliff's Notes, 718 F. Supp. at 1165.
48. Id. at 1167.
49. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497.
50. Id at 493.
51. Id at 493 (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
52. Id. at 493.
53. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
54. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
55. 886 F.2d at 494 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
56. 886 F.2d at 494.
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titles." Moreover, the appellate court held that the Rogers balancing
approach was generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works
of artistic expression, which include parodies. 8
The appellate court believed that the Polaroid test was not appropri-
ate for parodies because "[t]he Polaroid test has its origin in cases of
purely commercial exploitation, which do not raise First Amendment
concerns."- 9 Although the district court found a strong likelihood of
confusion, the appellate court had the power to review the district court's
ruling as a matter of law because the determination was a legal conclu-
sion." The court also held that the risk of confusion was very slight, and
did not outweigh the "well-established public interest in parody." 6 To
support its holding, the court concluded that the cover of Spy Notes dif-
fered in many respects from Cliffs Notes, 62 that Cliffs did not plan to
condense the books used in Spy Notes, and that Cliffs Notes traditionally
summarized the classic literary works rather than the modern works
"outside the mainstream" which Spy Notes satirized.63
III. BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW
A. Scope of Trademark Law
A trademark is a brand name which can be a word, name, device, or
symbol used to distinguish goods and services." Trademarks are omni-
present in this modern age, and most people have become familiar with
trade words such as "Coke is It," or trade names like Ford and IBM, or
trade symbols such as McDonald's golden arches and Pillsbury's Dough
Boy. These trademarks serve both the businesses and consumers. For
businesses, a trademark is a means of obtaining brand loyalty, and for
consumers, a trademark creates instant recognition of products they
purchase.65 Trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, can last forever
as long as they are used to distinguish goods or services.66
57. Id
58. Id. at 495.
59. Id. at 495 n.3.
60. Id
61. 886 F.2d at 495.
62. Id at 496.
63. Id
64. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as including "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods .. " 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1990).
65. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.10[A], at 18 (1989).
66. However, trademarks can fall into the public domain if a trademark has been discon-
tinued with intent not to resume, or when the mark becomes a generic name for goods or
1991]
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. Federal Protection of Trademarks: the Lanham Act
Trademark rights arise under the common law6 as well as federal
law.68 Trademark law is not the exclusive domain of federal law, and
Congress' power to legislate trademarks is limited to interstate transac-
tions.69 Thus, federal trademark protection is granted only when busi-
nesses use trademarks in interstate commerce, and state law only offers
protection to businesses using trademarks within that particular state."0
Under federal law, the Lanham Act"' offers considerably more pro-
tection to businesses using trademarks in interstate transactions than the
common law: a federally registered trademark is prima facie evidence of
the validity of registration,72 the registration serves as constructive notice
to others of a claim of ownership,73 and confers other advantages as
well.74
services in connection with which it is used. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1990). For a further
discussion on the issue of non-use and abandonment, see Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40
(2d Cir. 1989).
67. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that "[c]ommon-law trademarks, and
the right to their exclusive use, are, of course, to be classed among property rights... but only
in the sense that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good
will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others, is a property right, for
the protection of which a trademark is an instrumentality." Hanover Star Milling Company v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
68. Congress first provided for the registration of trademarks in 1870, and added criminal
penalties for infringement several years later, but trademark law remained essentially a matter
of common law until 1946, when Congress passed the Lanham Act and established the current
statutory framework for registering marks and redressing claims of infringement. Plasticolor
Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing
Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 Trademark Rep. 121, 129-38
(1978)).
69. Leafier, supra note 65, § 1.10[A], at 19.
70. Id.
71. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1128 (West 1990).
72. Id. at § 1057(b).
73. Id. at § 1072.
74. In addition, registration confers federal jurisdiction without regard to diversity of citi-
zenship or amount in controversy; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1121 (West 1990); registration can be-
come incontestable after five years of continuous use of the mark and will constitute exclusive
right to use the mark; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1065 (West 1990); registration confers the right to
receive treble damages, attorney's fees, and other remedies in an action for infringement; see 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1116-1120 (West 1990); and registration confers the right to request customs offi-
cials to bar importation of goods bearing infringing trademarks; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1124 (West
1990).
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C Trademark Infringement
1. Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act
Under the Lanham Act,75 a trademark is infringed upon when a
third party, without authorization, uses a confusingly similar mark on
similar goods or services.7" To establish the requisite level of confusion,
the plaintiff must show a "likelihood that an appreciable number of ordi-
narily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply con-
fused, as to the source of goods in question."" A trademark owner can
bring a lawsuit in federal court against an infringer to enjoin the in-
fringer's use of his trademark, and seek damages as well.78
In the early stages of trademark law, an owner's right to prevent
infringement of a trademark applied only in cases where consumers actu-
ally believed that the other's product originated with the trademark
owner. 7  Courts later eliminated the requirement of showing actual con-
fusion because it was a standard too difficult to prove,80 and required
instead a showing of a mere likelihood of confusion.8"
The prohibition against unauthorized uses of trademarks which are
likely to cause consumer confusion serves various social interests. Trade-
mark protection shields the public from misleading information in the
marketplace,82 prevents the unjust enrichment of the infringer, who
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. The owner of a federally registered trademark is protected from unauthorized uses that
are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a)
(West 1990). Courts decide the issue of infringement by determining whether there is a likeli-
hood of confusion arising from the defendant's use of a trademark similar to the plaintiff's.
For instance, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988), the court
decided that a toy company's use of "Gung-Ho" would cause consumer confusion because
another toy company had previously used that trademark to sell a line of toys.
77. Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distr., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317, 1321 (2d
Cir. 1987) (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.
1978)).
78. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111-28.
79. In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (quoting United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97), Justice Holmes stated that "[a] trademark only gives
the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of
another's product as his."
80. Seee.g, Standard Oil Co. of N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973 (10th Cir.
1932); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989).
82. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In
that case, the plaintiffs were the owners of the trademark FAT BOYS, a popular "rap" group
which is distinctly recognizable because it is composed of overweight young black singers, who
perform wearing square studded eyeglasses, satin baseball jackets and large, gold name pen-
dants around their necks. Their songs send a message to young people to avoid all use of drugs
or alcohol. The defendants Miller Brewing Company and Backer & Spielvogel hired FAT
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could gain by adopting the trademark owner's reputation as his own,8 3
and insulates the trademark owner from the possibility that the infringer
will pass inferior products to the public as those of the owner, harming
the owner's reputation.s"
2. Trademark Dilution
As trademark law evolved, courts no longer felt that the consumer
confusion theory afforded trademark owners adequate protection. 5
Trademark is an efficient way to convey large amounts of valuable infor-
mation to the consumer through advertising techniques, because a trade-
mark owner is able to transform its mark into a symbolic expression of
information about price, quality, and general desirability of its prod-
ucts.8 6 For example, McDonald's golden arches logo triggers an almost
Pavlovian 7 reaction in consumers that McDonald's sells hamburgers
BOYS look-alikes with the particular characteristics and performance styles of the individual
plaintiffs, for a beer commercial. The FAT BOYS alleged in part that the defendant's com-
mercial represented a deliberate attempt to misrepresent, mislead and confuse the public into
falsely believing that the commercial was performed by the FAT BOYS and that the FAT
BOYS endorsed the drinking of beer, and specifically the Miller product. The court held that
the defendants infringed upon the FAT BOYS trademark. Thus, the trademark protection
shielded the public from falsely believing that the FAT BOYS endorsed beer drinking, and
specifically Miller's beer.
83. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
In that case, Coca-Cola brought a suit against Alma-Leo, who sold a bubble gum product in
the form of white powder packaged in a plastic container resembling a Coca-Cola bottle. The
court held that Alma-Leo's use of a container similar to the one used by Coca-Cola violated
the state's anti-dilution statute (which prevents the dilution of a trademark's distinctiveness).
84. Id. The sale of defendant's product would injure Coca-Cola's reputation because
Alma-Leo's white powder had a texture similar to the drug cocaine. The court's ruling of
trademark protection prevented the defendant from unjust enrichment, who could gain by
using Coca-Cola's bottle to attract purchasers. In addition, the court's ruling prevented the
possibility that Alma-Leo pass its drug look-alike products as those of Coca-Cola, which
would harm Coca-Cola's reputation.
85. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 824-
30 (1927).
86. Id at 818-19.
87. Pavlov was a Russian scientist who studied the relationship between stimulus and re-
sponse in animals. In one experiment, Pavlov served food to dogs while ringing a bell. Nor-
mally, dogs salivate in the presence of food. In the experiment, the dogs salivated in the
presence of the food while the bell was ringing. After a while, Pavlov rang the bell without
serving food, and the sound of the bell alone caused the dogs to salivate. Thus, Pavlov's exper-
iment concluded that a stimulus which had no inherent power to create a response, e.g. the
sound of the bell, could create a response, e.g. the dog's salivation, if it is initially associated
with a stimulus that has inherent power to create a response, e.g. food.
By analogy, a trademark can create a similar reaction in humans. For instance, when a
customer eats in a McDonald's for the first time, he/she will eat in the presence of the golden
arches displayed in various areas of the restaurant. When a customer becomes familiar with
McDonald's, it will associate the golden arches in advertisements, a stimulus with no inherent
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and fries at a reasonable price and that they enjoy consuming these prod-
ucts. Therefore, the chief value of a trademark lies in its ability to associ-
ate favorable experiences or impressions with the product, not simply in
its capacity to identify the source or sponsorship of that product."8 As a
result, many states have extended the trademark owner's property rights
to protect the dilution of the trademark, even if the unauthorized uses of
the trademark do not cause consumer confusion.89
D. Tests Used to Determine Trademark Infringement
1. The Traditional Trademark Test: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp.
In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,9° Polaroid Corpora-
tion, the owner of the trademark Polaroid, brought a suit against Polarad
Corporation, alleging in part that defendant Polarad Electronic's use of
the name Polarad as a trademark, infringed plaintiff's federal and state
trademark rights.91 Both Polaroid and Polarad were involved in elec-
tronics for use in television, though Polaroid was primarily involved in
the field of optics.92 The court selected various factors to determine the
likelihood of consumer confusion.93 However, it failed to reach the issue
of consumer confusion because it upheld the technical conclusion of the
district court that Polaroid's failure to sue defendant earlier resulted in
laches.
94
power, with the food and drinks that McDonald's serves, a stimulus with inherent power, and
react in the same manner than if the consumer were presented with McDonald's food and
drinks. Thus, McDonald's trademark symbol alone has the power to create a response in a
customer's mind.
88. Schechter, supra note 85, at 818.
89. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026
(2d Cir. 1989). The "[1]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringe-
ment of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services." Id. at 1027 (quoting N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 368 (d)). The purpose of the statute
serves as preventing "the whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling power and
value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products." Id at 1028 (quoting
1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49).
90. 287 F.2d 492 (1961).
91. Id. at 493.
92. Id. at 496.
93. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. The court also added that these factors
were expandable, and that courts may take other variables into account. 287 F.2d at 495.
94. Id. at 496. Laches is an equitable defense arising when there has been an unexplained
delay in asserting a right of such duration and character as to render the enforcement of the
right inequitable. Such neglect or omission to assert a right over a period of time operates as a
bar to relief. STATSKY, LEGAL THESAURus/ DICTIONARY 445 (1985).
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2. The Modem Test of Rogers v. Grimaldi
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,9" the actress Ginger Rogers brought a suit
against the producers and distributors of the movie Ginger and Fred for
violation of the Lanham Act and infringement of the common-law rights
of publicity and privacy.96 Ginger Rogers complained that the title of
the movie97 left the impression that the film was about her, or that she
sponsored, endorsed, or was involved in the film.98 The appellate court
recognized the producer's first amendment right of artistic freedom, and
narrowly construed the Lanham Act to apply to "artistic works only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression." 99 The court held that danger of re-
stricting artistic expression by forcing the producers to change the
movie's title outweighed the slight risk that a celebrity's name might im-
plicitly suggest endorsement, and thus allowed the movie to retain its
original title.1°
E. Trademark Parody Analysis
The courts have had a difficult time in arriving at a coherent ap-
proach to trademark parody and this has resulted in inconsistent rul-
ings. 101 The difficulty in analyzing trademark parody cases stems from
the conflicting policies that trademarks and parodies serve: the former
serve to protect product recognition,10 2 and the latter protect a first
amendment form of expression. 10 3 To reconcile these competing policies,
some courts have implicitly applied copyright law principles of the fair
use doctrine, which serve as a defense to infringement of copyrighted
works."°4 The reason why courts have applied the fair use doctrine,
which only applies to copyright law, to trademark law, is because the
copyright analogy is helpful to understand the special protection that
95. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 997.
97. The movie was entitled Ginger and Fred because the film tells the story of two fictional
Italian cabaret performers who imitated the popular dancers Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire,
and became known in Italy as "Ginger and Fred." Id. at 996-97.
98. Id. at 997.
99. Id. at 999.
100. 875 F.2d at 1000.
101. See supra note 9.
102. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1990).
103. In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), the court stated
that "as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of substantial
freedom- both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism."
104. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
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parodies are granted under the first amendment."' 5 Parodies of literary
works serve a socially informative function by exposing the original's
flaws and pretensions."° Thus, by analogy to copyright law, trademark
parodies serve a socially informative function by exposing the original
product's flaws, which is a form of free expression protected by the first
amendment. 107
IV. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Fair Use in General
Fair use has been defined as a "privilege in others than the owner of
a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner with-
out his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner. ' '
The Copyright Act of 19761°9 established a four-factor test to deter-
mine whether the use of another's copyright constitutes fair use.110 The
test determines (1) "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;"'11 (2) "the nature of the copyrighted work;" I2 (3) "the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole;""' 3 and (4) "the effect of the use upon the po-
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work.""II4
105. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use And First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1079, 1105 n.138 (1986) (citing Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech- The Replacement of
the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 42 (1980)).
106. Shaughnessy, supra note 105 at 1105 n.138.
107. 886 F.2d at 493. The court stated that "parody is a form of artistic expression, pro-
tected by the First Amendment."
108. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (quoting H. Ball, Copyright and Literary Property 260
(1944)).
109. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1990).
110. Id. at § 107.
111. Id. at § 107(l). Generally, a non-profit educational use is more likely to constitute a
fair use because it is less likely to affect the market for the copyrighted work than a commercial
use would. In addition, a use in bad faith, such as deliberate copying, is less likely to be a fair
use because fair use implies notions of good faith and fair dealing. Leaffer, supra note 65 at
299-300.
112. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West 1990). The policy behind this factor is that there should
be greater access to some types of works to increase society's wealth of information. For
instance, the fair use privilege is more readily granted for scientific and historical works than
entertainment. Leaffer, supra note 65 at 301-02.
113. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West 1990). This factor focuses on whether the defendant has
taken more than is necessary to satisfy the fair use purpose. Excessive copying not commensu-
rate with the goal of the use does not constitute fair use. Leaffer, supra note 65 at 302-03.
114. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West 1990). This factor is the single most important element of
fair use, because any harm to the market for the copyright owner's work will remove the
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B. Parody as Fair Use
A parody is "an imitation for humorous or satirical effect of a piece
of literature, music, or composition."' 5 Often the purpose of parody is
to poke fun at the original work and, as a result, copyright owners will
rarely license their work for purposes of satire.'16 Therefore, parodists
must satirize works without the copyright owners' license, and must rely
on the defense of fair use when they are sued for copyright
infringement." 1
7
In determining whether the parody of another's work constitutes
fair use, courts focus mainly on the third and fourth factors"' of section
107 because most parodies are commercial in nature and thus could not
qualify as fair use under the first two factors" 9 of section 107.120 Under
the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the use,' 2' courts gen-
erally grant the parodist sufficient latitude to cause a reader or viewer to
"recall or conjure up" the original work in order for the parody to be
successful.' 22  Under the fourth factor, the effect upon the market,
23
courts will generally decide in favor of the parodist, unless the parodist
copied nearly all of the original work.
124
incentives for creativity that the copyright monopoly is designed to encourage. Leaffer, supra
note 65 at 303-04.
115. Leafier, supra note 65 at 311.
116. Id. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). In Fisher, a law firm
representing disc jockey Rick Dees, Atlantic Recording and Warner contacted Marvin Fisher,
and requested permission to use part or all of his music to "When Sunny Gets Blue" in order
to create a comedic and inoffensive version of the song. Fisher refused the request, but Dees
and the other defendants nonetheless recorded a parody of Fisher's song, which they entitled
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue." Most authors and composers, like Marvin Fisher, do not appreci-
ate their work altered for satirical purposes, and are unlikely to grant parodists a license to
modify their original composition.
117. Leaffer, supra note 65 at 311.
118. The third factor establishes the amount and substantiality of the use, and the fourth
factor examines the market effect that result from defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark. 17
U.S.C.A. § 107(3-4) (West 1990).
119. The first factor determines the purpose and character of the use, and the second factor
determines the nature of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1-2) (West 1990).
120. Leaffer, supra note 65 at 313.
121. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West 1990).
122. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (1964).
123. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West 1990).
124. For a case holding that the parodist copied nearly all of the original work, see Benny v.
Lowe's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); see infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
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V. CRITICISM OF THE APPELLATE COURT'S REASONING
IN Cliffs Notes
The court of appeals in Cliffs Notes 2 ' abrogated the trademark
owner's right to avoid consumer confusion and trademark dilution.' 2 6
The court only examined favorable factors to the parodist in the con-
sumer confusion prong of the Rogers test, 12 7 and failed to establish the
boundaries of the fair use doctrine under the free expression prong of the
Rogers test.' 28 As a result, the court granted to infringers a virtually
unlimited freedom to parodize trademarks.
129
A. The Appellate Court Only Selected Factors Most Favorable to the
Parodists Under the Consumer Confusion Prong
of the Rogers Test
The appellate court in Cliffs Notes held that the district court erred
as a matter of law in applying the Polaroid factors. 130 Yet the appellate
court used similar factors to determine the consumer confusion prong of
the Rogers test.
131
In addition, the appellate court used only the Polaroid factors most
favorable to Doubleday and omitted the factors which were harmful to
Doubleday. The court looked at the degree of similarity between the two
marks: it discussed the differences between Spy Notes and Cliffs Notes,
stating that the cover of Spy Notes contained red, blue and white colors,
which do not appear on the cover of Cliffs Notes; the Spy Notes cover
showed a sculpture of New York City rather than a sculpture of a bare
cliff; and the price quoted on the cover of Spy Notes was twice the price
of Cliffs Notes.'3 2 The court also looked at the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap: it stated that the books Spy Notes summarized
are contemporary and outside the mainstream, whereas Cliffs Notes sum-
marized the traditional great classics, and had no intention to create
summaries of the books Spy Notes summarized. 33 The court looked at
the actual confusion of consumers: it stated that most consumers would
realize that Spy Notes was a parody. 134 Finally, the court looked at the
125. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
126. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
127. 886 F.2d at 495-97.
128. Id. at 495.
129. Id. at 494.
130. Id. at 495.
131. Id. at 496. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
132. 886 F.2d at 496.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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sophistication of the buyers: it stated that college students were the larg-
est audiences for both Cliffs Notes and Spy Magazine, implying that con-
sumers were sufficiently sophisticated to know that Spy Notes was a
parody of Cliff Notes written by Spy Magazine.'" The court discussed
these factors, which can arguably favor the parodist,'36 but failed to ad-
dress a crucial Polaroid factor, the strength of plaintiff's mark, which
balances in favor of Cliffs.' 37 The district court, discussing the strength
of Cliffs Notes mark, found that Cliff's mark was highly distinctive, eas-
ily identifiable, and strong, especially since Cliffs Notes had been in circu-
lation for over thirty years.
138
The appellate court thus fashioned a test very similar to Polaroid's,
but excluded the factors which would harm parodists. The appellate
court justified its interpretation of the Polaroid test by stating that in the
context of parody, the Polaroid factors should be applied with proper
weight given to first amendment considerations.139 However, the court
already gave proper weight to first amendment considerations in the free
expression prong of the test.140 The test to determine likelihood of con-
sumer confusion is no longer a balancing test since all the factors now
weigh in favor of parodists. Therefore, trademark owners will have
much more difficulty proving consumer confusion.
B. The Appellate Court Allowed Parodies More Freedom Than
Authorized by the Fair Use Doctrine
The appellate court stated that in the context of copyright infringe-
ment, parody was at least entitled "to conjure up the original and [could]
do more."''  However, the appellate court's vague statement failed to
establish the boundaries of what a parodist can copy under the conjure
up test. The court should have applied a complete parody fair use analy-
sis rather than borrow an isolated quote from a case'42 to establish the
135. Id
136. The court, in its discussion of Polaroid factor (2) "degree of similarity between the two
marks," stressed the differences rather than the similarity of the two marks. However, this
factor is intended to discover what the parodist has borrowed from the trademark owner, not
to reveal the differences in the products. Thus, the court's analysis of this factor was incorrect;
this factor should have favored Cliffs because Spy Notes' cover was very similar to Cliffs Notes'.
Id. at 495-97.
137. 718 F. Supp. at 1165.
138. Id.
139. 886 F.2d at 495 n.3.
140. Id. at 495.
141. Id. at 495 (citing Elsmere Music Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253,
n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
142. The appellate court in Cliffs Notes stated that a parody is entitled 'at least' to conjure
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boundaries of fair use under case law.
The following paragraphs analyze the facts of Cliffs Notes under a
fair use defense as applied to parodies. In particular they examine sec-
tion 107(3) 1 3 of the fair use doctrine, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used, because the other factors are not as relevant to analyze
parody cases.'"
1. Doubleday's Use of Cliff's Features Constitutes
Near-Verbatim Copying
Doubleday copied Cliffs' prominent features, such as the yellow and
black diagonal stripes, the format and type of the titles, and a picture of a
clay model in the lower right corner. 145 Doubleday also featured its re-
view of books in the same format as Cliffs'.'" Doubleday's use of Cliffs'
prominent features resembles the copying that took place in Jack Benny's
version of Gas Light and Showcase Atlanta's parody of Gone With The
Wind, in Benny v. Lowe's, Inc. ("Benny") 47 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod. ("MGM" 148 respectively.
In Benny, a Ninth Circuit case, the owner of a motion picture enti-
tled Gas Light brought an action against comedian Jack Benny for copy-
right infringement after Columbia Broadcasting Systems ("CBS") wrote
and produced a half-hour long show satirizing Gas Light, with Jack
Benny in the leading role. '" The district court found that the locale and
period of the works were the same, that the main setting was the same,
that the characters were generally the same, and that the story points
were practically identical. 50 The appellate court held that the part cop-
ied was a substantial part of the plaintiff's work, and thus constituted
infringement. ''
Similarly, in MGM, Showcase Atlanta, a theater company, pro-
duced a play which was very similar to MGM's copyrighted film Gone
with the Wind. '52 The court held that Showcase Atlanta's play was not
protected by the fair use doctrine because it incorporated more material
the original and can do more. 886 F.2d at 495 (quoting Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980)).
143. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West 1990).
144. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
145. 718 F. Supp. at 1161.
146. Id.
147. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
148. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
149. 239 F.2d at 533.
150. Id. at 535-36.
151. Id. at 537.
152. 479 F. Supp. at 354.
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from Gone with the Wind than was allowed under the conjure up test:
"[it] closely follow[ed] the general plot of the film, cop[ied] specific inci-
dents and details extensively, and reproduc[ed] significant portions of the
dialogue in a nearly identical manner."
1 53
Thus, Doubleday's use of Cliffs' prominent features resembles the
near-verbatim copying that took place when Jack Benny and Showcase
Atlanta borrowed the plots, specific incidents, and significant portions of
dialogue in Benny 154 and MGM. 5
Doubleday's use of Cliff's prominent features was near-verbatim
copying, and would not constitute fair use in copyright law. As a result,
the appellate court should have permanently enjoined Doubleday from
publishing its Spy Notes. Even if Doubleday's use of Cliffs' features did
not constitute near-verbatim copying, Doubleday borrowed more fea-
tures than necessary to conjure up Cliffs Notes.
2. Doubleday's Use of Cliffs' Features Borrowed More Than
Necessary to Conjure Up Cliffs Notes
Doubleday's borrowing of Cliffs' features resembles Air Pirates' use
of Disney's characters in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates. 56 In
Walt Disney, Disney brought an action against Air Pirates, a company
which infringed Disney's copyrights by copying the graphic depictions of
over seventeen characters' 57 in an underground comic book.' The
comic book centered around a gloomy "depiction of the Disney charac-
ters as active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting
counterculture."1 59 The characters were represented as insects and ani-
mals endowed with human qualities, but bore a marked similarity"6 to
153. Id. at 359.
154. 239 F.2d at 535-36.
155. 479 F. Supp. at 359.
156. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
157. Id. at 753. The characters included such favorites as Mickey and Minnie Mouse, Don-
ald Duck, the Big Bad Wolf, the Three Little Pigs, and Goofy. Id. at 753 n.5.
158. Id. at 752-53.
159. Id. at 753. Air Pirate's depiction of the Disney characters was clearly antithetical to
Disney's image which sought to foster "an image of innocent delightfulness." Id. at 753 (quot-
ing Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 564, 571, 582
(1976)).
160. "Marked similarity" is a term of art used in copyright law that means any kind of
similarity that would lead a person to conclude that a person may have copied. This type of
similarity does not seek to distinguish aspects of copying that are protected under the copy-
right law; it is a broad test to determine whether any copying, protected or not, has taken
place. Lecture from Lionel Sobel to Copyright Law Class at Loyola Law School (Oct. 18,
1990) (discussing infringement of copyrights).
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the Disney characters.' 6 ' The court held that Air Pirates borrowed more
of Disney's characters than they were allowed to conjure up the original
characters, because its characters were very similar to Disney's charac-
ters, and the names given to its characters were the same names used by
Disney characters.1 62 The court also stated that given the widespread
public recognition of the major characters involved, very little borrowing
would have been necessary to place Disney characters and their image in
the minds of the readers. 163 In addition, the court stated that when copy-
ing took place in a comic book, a recognizable caricature was not difficult
to draw, so that defendant could have copied much less of the original
characters to produce the parody.164
Spy Notes features bear a marked similarity to Cliffs Notes features,
just as Air Pirate's characters bore a marked similarity to Disney's char-
acters. Since Cliffs Notes features have a wide public recognition, just as
Disney's characters, Doubleday had no need to borrow as many features
as it did to conjure up Cliffs Notes. Thus, Doubleday's extensive use of
Cliff's features did not constitute fair use because it borrowed more fea-
tures than necessary to conjure up Cliffs Notes.
Doubleday's use of Cliffs' features is also analogous to "Garbage
Pail Kid's" use of "Cabbage Patch Kid's" features in Original Appalach-
ian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 1
65
In Original Appalachian, a manufacturer of chewing gum and base-
ball cards derisively depicted Original Appalachian Artworks' Cabbage
Patch Kids dolls by producing Garbage Pail Kids stickers, which feature
characteristics similar to those of plaintiff's dolls in "rude, violent, and
frequently noxious settings."'' 66 The court held that Topps' copying did
not constitute fair use, because the artist who designed a majority of the
Garbage Pail stickers was instructed by the director of Topps to purpose-
fully copy "substantial amounts of Cabbage Patch Kids' features."1 67
The court held that such close copying was impermissible to constitute
fair use. '
68
Doubleday's borrowing of Cliffs Notes' features is similar to Original
Appalachian's borrowing of Cabbage Patch Kids' features, because the
designer of Spy Notes' cover purposefully copied substantial amounts of
161. Air Pirates; 581 F.2d at 753.
162. Id.
163. Id at 758.
164. Id.
165. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
166. Id at 1032.
167. Id. at 1033.
168. Id. at 1036.
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Cliffs Notes' cover,169 just as the artist who designed the Garbage Pail
Kids' stickers purposefully copied Cabbage Patch Kids' features. Thus,
such close copying of Cliffs' similar features conjured up more than nec-
essary to recall Cliffs Notes' cover, just as Garbage Pail Kids' features
conjured up more than necessary to recall the Cabbage Patch Kids dolls.
Moreover, the facts of Cliffs Notes are analogous to the cases dis-
cussed previously, 7° which held that parodists' use constituted near-ver-
batim copying, and the parodists conjured up more than necessary to
recall the original work. As a result, Doubleday's use of Cliffs' promi-
nent features did not constitute fair use. Therefore, Doubleday should
have been enjoined from distributing its Spy Notes.
3. The Facts of Cliffs Notes Are Distinguishable From Cases That
Have Held Parodists' Borrowing Constituted Fair Use
Doubleday's use of Cliffs Notes' features is distinguishable from
Mad Magazine's use of Irving Berlin's songs in Berlin v. E C. Publica-
tions, Inc. 7 In Berlin, Irving Berlin sued Mad Magazine alleging that
Mad Magazine's publication of satiric parody lyrics to his songs in-
fringed the copyrighted originals. 72 However, Mad Magazine did not
reproduce the music of plaintiff's compositions; 73 it had only used the
titles, the meter, and an occasional phrase from Berlin's original lyrics.
174
The court held that defendant's lyrics did not substantially borrow from
plaintiff's copyright, and defendant's occasional use of plaintiff's lyrics
were necessary to "recall or conjure up" the originals.
175
Doubleday used more features from Cliffs Notes than Mad Maga-
zine borrowed in Berlin because Mad Magazine merely printed lyrics in
the same measures as the plaintiff's songs and borrowed an occasional
lyric from the original song, where Doubleday, on the other hand, copied
most of Cliffs Notes' prominent features.
Similarly, Doubleday's use of Cliffs Notes' features is distinguishable
169. 886 F.2d at 492. The court stated that "[a]ppellant readily admitted that it copied the
prominent features of Cliffs Notes in order to make Spy Notes an effective parody."
170. See supra notes 141-69 and accompanying text.
171. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
172. Under copyright law, a plaintiff has a cause of action for copyright infringement when
a defendant creates a derivative work of plaintiff's original work without the copyright owner's
license; see M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.5, at 209 (1989). In this
case, Berlin alleged that Mad Magazine's printed lyrics represented an unauthorized derivative
work of his original lyrics. 329 F.2d at 543.
173. 329 F.2d at 542.
174. Id. at 543.
175. Id. at 545.
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from "Saturday Night Live's"' 76 borrowing of eighteen seconds of the "I
Love New York" theme in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co. 177
In Elsmere Music, the court held that "Saturday Night Live's" ver-
sion of plaintiff's song "I Love New York" entitled "I Love Sodom" did
not appropriate more of the plaintiff's work than necessary to conjure up
the original. 17 ' The court reasoned that the defendant's repetition of "I
Love Sodom," sung a cappella and lasting for only eighteen seconds, was
not a substantial taking to preclude its use from being a fair one. 179
Doubleday's borrowing of most of Cliffs' prominent features consti-
tutes more borrowing than "Saturday Night Live's" borrowing of eight-
een seconds of "I Love New York," and would not constitute fair use.
Thus, Doubleday's borrowing of Cliffs' prominent features represents
substantially more borrowing than the previous cases discussed which
have held that the parodists borrowed sufficiently to conjure up the origi-
nals.'80 Doubleday's use of Cliffs Notes' features would not constitute
fair use under copyright law. Thus, the Cliffs Notes court, which implic-
itly used the fair use doctrine, should not have protected Doubleday's
parody because the parody does not constitute fair use under copyright
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The appellate court in Clffs Notes erred in its application of the
Rogers test for trademark infringement. Under the consumer confusion
prong, the court used only the most favorable factors to parodists, and
under the free expression prong, the court analogized to the copyright
law fair use doctrine, paying cursory attention to fair use precedent. As a
result, the appellate court's decision to allow Doubleday to publish its
Spy Notes with a cover similar to Cliffs' has given parodists unbridled
freedom to copy trademarks. This removal of trademark protection is
deplorable because trademarks are valuable instruments to businesses
who use them to distinguish their goods from others and act as a market-
ing device to create consumer loyalty.' 8
176. "Saturday Night Live" is a television show in which comedians perform live skits
satirizing recent events and celebrities.
177. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
178. The Saturday Night Live staff allegedly violated plaintiff's copyright by creating an
unauthorized derivative work, and Saturday Night Live asserted that its use of plaintiff's copy-
right constituted fair use. 623 F.2d at 253.
179. 482 F. Supp. at 747.
180. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
181. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.10[A], at 18 (1989).
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In addition, decisions like Cliffs Notes which utilize certain aspects
of copyright law's fair use analysis should apply a complete, rather than
an ad hoc limited analysis. Otherwise, courts will improperly analyze the
fair use doctrine, and arrive at results counter to those the fair use doc-
trine seeks to achieve.
David Alain Robinson
